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Abstract
This article approaches the issue of developing a consistent ethical stance in ed-ucational practice. It is suggested that reflection alone is insufficient and that 
it is necessary to call on a form of critical reflexivity, which recognises the embod-
ied nature of the practitioner’s response to the world. If a practitioner wishes to 
adopt a particular ethical stance, they need to be clear about how they themselves 
contribute to their own conditioning, and how that conditioning is embedded 
not only in cognition, but also in the body. Educational practice in action cannot 
be divorced from the essential nature of the practitioner, who is a psycho-physical 
unity. Change of practice, in the service of humanisation, is possible, but involves 
not only an intelligent critique of self and world, but awareness of how action is 
manifesting in the moment in classroom or school-related interaction.  
        John Dewey’s understanding of the nature of psycho-physical unity, to-
gether with the phenomenological insights of Merleau-Ponty are used as possible 
contributions towards consistency in conscientization.
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Critical Pedagogy and Reflexivity: The Issue of Ethical Consistency
“(T)he key to a correct theory of morality is recognition of the essential 
unity of the self and its acts”. (Dewey (1932) as cited in Hickman and 
Alexander, 1998, p. 343)
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“The world is ‘already there’ … as an inalienable presence”. (Merleau-
Ponty, 1996, p.vii) 
   How might an educational practitioner ensure their own action in the 
world matches their espoused moral stance? Is there a problem here at all, or do 
those who wish to be transformative in their practice automatically become con-
sistent in thought and action? One aspect of Freire’s concept of conscientization is 
that individuals develop a deepening awareness of both the socio-cultural world 
and their own potential for transforming that world (Freire, 1998). This article is 
about deepening awareness of self in the world, in the context of consistency of 
thought and action. It proposes a view of self as a psycho-physical unity, deeply 
connected to, and involved in, the world. I will suggest that consistency must be 
learned in the face of how we have already allowed ourselves to be formed and 
that we can do so by using reflexive critical insight into both a unitary self and the 
world which that self opens on to. 
The challenge for an educational practitioner who wants to be true to their 
moral creed, whether in the classroom, or in management and leadership, is to 
recognise any mismatch between creed and action. Reflection alone might help 
recognition, but I will suggest it is insufficient of itself. However, in critical reflex-
ivity, our embodied transactions, as well as intelligent critique of the world, have 
to be taken into account. This bi-directional critical awareness is much more than 
reflection. Through it we can be aware of the external impositions that the world 
makes on us (e.g. in through policy decisions), critiquing them for their capac-
ity to promote or impede the desired end of humanisation. But we also need to 
critique ourselves, to see if our own actions perpetuate the very cycle from which 
we hope to escape.    
The importance of context
Writing in support of critical reflexivity makes a demand on the writer to be 
transparent about their own context and agenda (e.g. Bourdieu, 2004) so I lay out 
below the professional, moral and theoretical context in which I am writing. I am 
currently an initial teacher-educator in an English university, with a background 
as a high school teacher of languages. Sadly, I did not come to know Freire’s work 
whilst I was still a high-school teacher. I think it would have helped me have a 
clearer understanding of what seemed to me to be a culture of domination and 
disempowerment in our state schooling system. Two aspects of this are relevant 
here: the hierarchical structure of school management which privileged senior 
leadership at the expense of the “rest”, and a tendency to hold back knowledge 
from learners categorised as anything less than of the highest ability.   I think that 
the former rather less than democratic attitude led to the latter by encouraging 
classroom teachers to view students as “lacking” and as vessels to be filled by the 
teachers who held the power on the basis on being more knowledgeable. 
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Although I had not encountered Freire, I had studied the thinking on psycho-
physical unity of John Dewey and F. M. Alexander and knew that the way we 
really think is revealed in our actions. We can hold certain ideas to be true and 
worthwhile and yet behave in a way which gives the contrary message. If we es-
pouse a particular moral stance, say a belief that students are entitled to the same 
sort of respect which we would pay to the school director, we have to ensure our 
way of acting is consistent with that belief. I discovered in myself that I could 
pay lip-service to a way of thinking but continue to act in a habitual way which 
announced a different personal agenda. Using Dewey and Alexander’s insights, 
I worked to bring consistency to my own behaviour by becoming aware of how 
both thought and action can be habitual and embodied.
When I moved into teacher-education in an English university, I was lucky 
enough to discover Freire’s work through collaborating on the development and 
teaching of a Master’s programme for educational practitioners based on critical 
pedagogy. Much data was collected from the graduates of this programme, but in 
the article I draw on one particular in-depth interview with one MA participant, 
Gary, who kindly gave permission to quote from his experience of applying criti-
cal reflexivity in his practice. Gary is a Mathematics teacher and assistant school 
director and therefore provides a view from classroom and from management and 
leadership. 
The theoretical framework I use in this article is based on Freire’s writing, as 
well as that of John Dewey, especially his work with F. M. Alexander, together 
with Charles Taylor’s interpretation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of embod-
ied perception. Freire and Dewey’s work supply the moral context, where change 
is “about doing on the basis of a language of hope” (McLaren & Leonard, 1993, 
p. 3). My personal experience as an educator has been that an increasing aware-
ness of the world, together with the smallness of one’s own agency can lead to a 
sense of hopelessness. The privileging of hope as an ethical principle by critical 
pedagogues therefore seems to me crucial. Why bother to work to change self 
and world if not for the hope that we can contribute to “the propagation of com-
munities and societies in which we can struggle towards a better local and global 
future”? (Freire as cited in McLaren & Leonard, 1993, p. xi)
 By having the “better future” as our goal, we are necessarily suggesting social 
change. I think both Freire and Dewey make clear that without the change of the 
individual, there can be no real social change. Dewey suggests that although in-
duction into society is a function of schooling, it is not an assimilative induction. 
The nature of schooling should be such that it gives individuals the capacity to 
construct a better world, and at the same time to reconstruct themselves: “educa-
tion is a regulation of the process of coming to share in the social consciousness … 
the adjustment of individual activity is the only sure method of social reconstruc-
tion” (Dewey, 1897/1964, p. 437). Dewey and Freire share a moral vision where 
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we become ourselves more fully, but not at the expense of others, nor in isolation 
from them: “To be human is to engage with relationships with others and with 
the world” (Freire, 1976, p. 3). Such a vision is about becoming more fully what 
we could be and in that sense is a move towards humanisation. I am suggesting 
that such a move can be achieved for the educational practitioner through critical 
reflexivity. 
Reflexivity in the literature
There is already a history of education literature advocating reflexivity in a 
range of environments (Bleakley, 1999; Cunliffe, 2004: Edge, 2011; Rolfe, 1997; 
Zeichner & Liston, 1996) as well as critiquing it (e.g. Lynch, 2000).  Particularly 
relevant in the advocacy group is Moore (2007) who reminds teachers that aware-
ness of how their students behave is only half of their task, suggesting they should 
be “encouraged to interrogate and critically reflect not only on their pupils’ behav-
iour or upon what happened (in terms of failure or success) in the classroom, but 
also on their own behaviours—on the way in which they responded to situations, 
interacted with other people” (pp. 130-1). This form of awareness of our own 
behaviour would seem to draw on Giddens’ (1991) view of reflexivity as monitor-
ing, where “human beings routinely ‘keep in touch’ with the grounds of what they 
do as an integral element of doing it” (p. 36).  My concern is that the difficulty of 
being in touch both with our operant theories and our behaviour as manifested in 
action, is greater than, say, Giddens and Moore suggest.
However, only two authors tackle the issue of unseen habitual patterns or 
the embodied aspect of being reflexive. One is Moore (1997), cited above, who 
refers to our embodied responses to situations and interaction with others. The 
other author is Cunliffe (2004), who in referring to “embodied, (whole body) re-
sponsive understanding” (p. 410) is not explicit that both parties in an interaction 
manifest a physical response, noting simply that “we react to eye contact, move-
ment and facial expressions” (p.415). There is room for both Moore and Cunliffe 
to go further in emphasising the importance of embodiment.
Some view reflexivity as nothing more than a not-to-be challenged big and 
more sophisticated sister of reflection, and thereby limit it to being a mental pro-
cess (D’Cruz, Gillingham & Melendez, 2007; Erlandson, 2005).  I argue that 
reflexivity is extended reflection, in that it includes the embodied self and its 
response to the other selves with whom that self interacts, and that it incorporates 
thoughtful action in the moment—Dewey’s  “thinking in activity” (Alexander, 
1985, p. 42). Such a holistic view allows for consideration of how we can make 
some attempt to ensure our action, including our reaction to others, and our es-
poused ethical stance are consistent.
A serious objection to any kind of reflective activity is raised by Lawes (2003), 
who points out the potential of self-interrogation as a means for domination of 
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the individual by others. I hope to convey in the following account a sense of 
what I see as the liberating aspect of reflexivity, in contrast to one that renders 
the operator of it more docile and responsive to manipulation (Foucault, 1993, 
1995), which occurs through increasing capacity for the exercise of intelligent 
responsibility for creative ends (Freire, 1972). 
The need to include awareness of self and world
           If our aim is to function within an educational system and a set of com-
munities where humanisation is the goal, then Dewey’s work on self as a psycho-
physical unity and at the same time, as part of the world, provides a tool.  Dewey’s 
ideas here can be complemented by Merleau-Ponty’s (1996), for both insist on 
our inability to be separate from the world: “The world is wholly inside and I am 
wholly outside of myself ” (p. 407).  It is this inter-relatedness of self and world 
which must be the focus of critical reflexivity. We ourselves are the embodiment of 
our ethical view; the self is revealed by action, visible to others, and revealed back 
to self through a kind of immediate recognition of our own behaviour.  
   Gary’s example below illustrates the change he was able to make having 
thought deeply about critical reflexivity on the MA. He explains, generalising 
from a particular interaction with a student, how he had a habitual pattern of 
behaviour, which was a response to fear of his authority being challenged.
When a student does something which you don’t feel is appropriate in 
front of you, it is not necessarily a direct challenge to your authority. And 
in fact sometimes they think they are interacting with you in a friendly 
way and you take it wrongly because you don’t understand where they 
are coming from and then tell them off when they have tried in their own 
way to be friendly towards you. Sometimes their over-friendliness comes 
out as a bad choice of language and it’s not that they are being insulting 
or abusive but just when they get excited or get carried away they choose 
what I consider to be a poor use of language but it’s the best that they’ve 
got. But after doing the assignment I realised that I know that student. 
They are not abusive or offensive, so why have they just chosen that lan-
guage? It was the only thing they could get in a rush to fit that situation. 
Before, I would have shouted at them and they would have gone away 
and never tried it again. (Gary, personal communication, September 20, 
2011)
Here we see an increase in Gary’s awareness of the world. He is able to 
split out a situation into the behaviour of the student, which he can then 
rationalise, and his own habitual response to that behaviour. His espoused 
ethical position is that he considers it right to encourage communication 
between himself and students on what we could call a real human level, 
that is, not the level of dominance and submission. Such communication 
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is essential, he believes, if he is to succeed in helping that student find more 
“appropriate” ways of relating to adults. In the moment of awareness, Gary 
opens up a choice to himself, which gives him a new possibility in his rela-
tionship as teacher- to-student.
In the next extract we see the theme of possibilities opening up as the habitual 
reaction to a situation is recognised. Gary notes the physiological response which 
accompanies the habitual thinking:
I’m beginning to see things from other perspectives, for example in meet-
ings which can become quite heated. I felt myself wanting to argue my 
case of why all the things that everyone else said were wrong . . . and I 
felt myself becoming warm and heated. And then I reflected that no, it’s 
a collegial debate and in this instance you have been overruled and then I 
felt for a little while that I had lost face. But then I thought, you haven’t. 
You’ve seen other people bring things up and not get them through and 
you haven’t felt any differently towards them. (Gary, personal communi-
cation, September 20, 2011)
In addition to the insight of embodiment of response within his own physiol-
ogy, Gary is deepening his awareness of his habitual fear of being wrong; he pauses 
to rationalise based on a new observation about how he and the world work, and 
again, opens up to himself a new possibility for thought and action. He sum-
marises the result here: 
… I feel more empowered in my relationships with colleagues and stu-
dents, and with failure as well, in being able to rationalise it and not 
take it personally by being reflexive. I feel empowered when I talk to 
colleagues, but because they are not reflexive and they have no idea how 
to be reflexive and they are sort blundering from one point to another. 
(Gary, personal communication, September 20, 2011)
Gary saw at that point how without critical reflexivity, there is an inevitability 
about our behaviour, because “you do things automatically. You respond to situ-
ations automatically.”  
Automaticity makes it hard for us to change.  Dewey’s discovered from his 
own experience with F. M. Alexander (Door, 2009) that the way we think is not 
separable from how we have learned to operate as a psycho-physical unity. He 
describes “our own psycho-physical disposition, as the basic condition of our em-
ployment of all agencies and energies … as the central instrumentality” (Dewey, 
1923, in Alexander, 2004, pp. xxxi-xxxii). And it is that ‘central instrumentality’ 
which is seen by other people.  However, inclusion of the body in our consider-
ation of our own behaviour does not immediately provide us with information 
about that behaviour. A grand assumption we might make is that we know what 
we are doing. But, as Dewey maintains: “[t]he hardest thing to attend to is that 
which is closest to ourselves, that which is constant and familiar. And this clos-
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est ‘something’ is, precisely, ourselves, our own habits and ways of doing things 
as agencies, in conditioning what is tried or done by us” (Dewey, 1923/2004, 
p. xxxi). Intelligent thinking, which I  conceptualise here as an important part 
of reflexive conduct, includes those two elements: the realisation that ‘we’ are 
psycho-physical entities and that it is hard to see what we are really doing because 
it is familiar. 
  For Gary, a pre-requisite for consistency of ethics and action was an admis-
sion that we have a limited awareness of how we manifest in the objective world of 
our institution, how we are perceived by others, and the impact we have on them. 
He started to develop this awareness consciously, having seen in small instances, 
as reported above, how he tended to act in a way that was not consistent with his 
ideals. In the admission of limited awareness and in tiny steps of action, he created 
the conditions for an openness to the world which is in opposition to the closure 
and stifling of possibility represented by: “Before, I would have shouted at them 
and they would have gone away and never tried it again” (Gary, 2011). In a sense 
the openness is unavoidable; because we are so much part of the world, “it is the 
natural setting of and field for all my thoughts and all my explicit perceptions” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1996, p. xi). In critical reflexivity, we don’t search for the truth 
about how we are in this world through introspection, as “there is no inner man, 
man is in the world and only in the world does he know himself ” (1996, p. xi). 
Instead, in a reflexive step, we assess the assumptions that lie behind our own ac-
tions when we actually spot them, and re-think them, either in the moment or 
later on, in a way that allows for some element of the new. This way must not be 
dominated by previously undisclosed (to us) habitual patterns, patterns which 
prevent new thoughts and thus new possibilities for action. As such, we are read-
ing self and world in order to be open to the new. In this account, critical reflexiv-
ity encompasses reflection and pre-reflection, or a kind of apparent automaticity. 
As Gary explained: “You do things automatically. You respond to situations auto-
matically” (2011). Such automaticity was not a state of affairs he found useful in 
making action fit with his espoused moral stance.
Our pre-reflective relationship with the world
 Understanding the existence of pre-reflection is important for seeing the 
difficulty of change. Taylor’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts on the 
extent of our unrealised and embodied involvement in the world is that. “[W]e 
are only able to form conceptual beliefs guided by our surroundings because we 
live in a preconceptual engagement with those surroundings” (Taylor as cited in 
Carmen & Hansen, 2005, p.38). So our consciousness of relationship with our 
world, i.e. with the pupils we teach, the colleagues we work with, in the way we 
walk around the school and sit in meetings, is one in which we have already re-
acted pre-reflectively. 
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What must be remembered here is that others have also already reacted to 
us—“they would have gone away” (Gary, 2011). Our understanding of our en-
vironment is deeply rooted in, and dependent on, that preconceptual response. 
Pre-reflection is the pre-verbalised awareness, pre-conscious and, importantly, 
embodied coping that are fundamental to existing. The coping can go wrong, but 
it is not beyond interrogation—if it were, we would be unable to change anything 
about our behaviour except at the most superficial level. Interrogation involves 
bringing embodied aspects of our coping to consciousness and as such is a ne-
glected part of reflection. But it is not done by introspection. We can have control 
over our pre-reflective coping, and it is not unnatural to do so. When we do have 
that control, we are “thinking in activity” (Alexander, 1985, p. 42). 
If you can sort of split yourself into two; the person in the moment and 
the other person  who is looking at that person in the moment and try-
ing to say ‘are you aware that there are other things impacting  on you 
now over which you don’t have much control, but which put you into 
this situation?’. And if you realised that, maybe you’d handle the situation 
a bit better, a bit more intellectually. (Gary, personal communication, 
September 20, 2011)
Working collaboratively within a school
 Attempting to work collaboratively in education in a humanistic way surely 
requires the individual to critically assess both institutional policy and their own 
response to that policy, and how they will work with other individuals within 
the group in implementing or in moderating that policy. In this instance I use 
the word “critically” synonymously with “intelligently”: “Intelligence becomes 
ours in the degree to which we use it and accept responsibility for consequences” 
(Dewey, 1957, p. 287). The consequences here are how we manifest to others in 
concrete, objective terms and this necessarily includes our preconceptual reaction 
to them—“I felt myself becoming warm and heated” (Gary, 2011)—and theirs to 
ours—“they think they are interacting with you in a friendly way” (Gary, 2011).
Not only did Dewey position us as a psycho-physical unity, but he, prior to 
Merleau-Ponty, doubted our complete separation from the world. He interprets 
objectivity as an interactive, on-going process that enables us to read what we 
could call the “sub-text” of self that might otherwise be either invisible, or not 
quite the way we think it is, when it comes into action in the objective world, the 
world of others with whom we have relationships. Dewey calls objectivity “inclu-
sive interaction” (1929,  p.259 where perceiving being and perceived thing are not 
separate but are dynamically interrelated. 
The last sections have focused very much on the individual and interaction 
with others, and it is perhaps possible to argue that that is all that social reality 
consists in. But in an educational context, we deal with consequences of politics 
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and policy (Ball, 2013). Because of that, and because Freire, Dewey and Merleau-
Ponty all emphasise our being in the world, not simply our being, I want to make 
the explicit link here to the ethical self in a wider context. 
In Pedagogy of the Oppressed Freire (1972) points to the need for a 
“deepened consciousness” of situation leading to the realisation that social 
reality is “susceptible of transformation” (p. 73). In a practical theory of 
critically reflexive responsibility, this realisation that things could be dif-
ferent is fundamental.  Collaborating individuals must make that step 
of realisation, and by applying the concept of reflexivity accept that they 
are operating as social agents “within the space of a game,” (Bourdieu, 
2004, p. 62) the rules of which have been pre-determined by other players 
than themselves, but require them (the individual) to put those rules into 
practice. The rules are generally, in education, little more than “validated 
opinion” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 72). In our critically reflexive scenario, the 
individual educational agent must take responsibility for implementing or 
operating a policy within their working environment. They must decide 
whether the initiative presented to them is in the best interest of humanisa-
tion, if such is their particular ethical stance. And it is here that knowing 
what that stance is and deciding whether it is possible to act consistently 
with it becomes important. 
Humanisation or perpetuation of the old cycle?
  Whether we are in the classroom, or involved with school management or 
leadership, does our objective presence, our manner of acting, belie any espoused 
commitment to movement towards humanisation, or is it in fact contributing to a 
cycle of domination and subjection (Chomsky & Macedo, 2000)?  There is a clear 
theoretical framework already laid down for such commitment. Where transfor-
mation is the aim (in the humanist sense described by Freire in the first chapter 
of Pedagogy of the Oppressed) no change of the world of social relations can take 
place separately from the transformation of individuals, particularly those on the 
“dispensing” side of the education system. Freire sees the danger of the use of the 
“educated class” by any existing hegemony, as non-critical intellectuals become 
“indispensable in the mind-control endeavour and schools play an important role 
in this process” (Chomsky & Macedo, 2000, p. 25). Educationalists who do not 
operate critical reflexion can be compared to Freire’s uncritical intellectuals, or to 
the “oppressed”, who suffer from the duality which has established itself in their 
innermost being. They discover that without freedom they cannot exist authenti-
cally. Yet although they desire authentic existence, they fear it. They are at one 
and the same time themselves and the oppressor whose consciousness they have 
internalized. (Freire, 1972, p. 32) 
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This is the kind of situation where the teacher, wearing the cloak of authority, 
and forgetting how to relate, one human being to another, which Gary sought to 
avoid: 
sometimes they think they are interacting with you in a friendly way and 
you take it wrongly because you don’t understand where they are com-
ing from and then tell them off when they have tried in their own way 
to be friendly towards you. (Gary, personal communication, September 
20, 2011)
 The argument can be summarised like this: in order to be an educational 
practitioner with a consistent moral stance in an educational community, criti-
cal gaze must be turned on self as well as world. If change is expected of both self 
and world, as opposed to simply the latter, it can be termed “reflexive”. When 
consciously conceived and operated, such reflexivity is critical; it does not auto-
matically accept the status quo and it admits of the engaged, embodied nature of 
self. In order to be critically reflexive, the practitioner must engage as honestly 
as they can with their own behaviour, conceptual and pre-conceptual and often 
habitual. They must be able to at least recognise that others have conceptual and 
preconceptual habitual behaviour. The behaviour is not simply intellectual, but is 
thought of in terms of a psycho-physical objective self in the real world of an edu-
cational institution. Self-awareness must involve a realisation that we are physical 
objects always positioned in the world.  What is sought is the catching sight of 
self as it manifests in thought and action. In catching sight of this manifesting self, 
there is the opportunity to check what we think we are doing with what we are 
actually doing and thus allow the new to enter and personal change to happen. 
Change involves not looking inward as such, but assessing thinking through ac-
tion in the world. Recognising pre-conceptual automaticity for what it is gives us 
the choice to act in accordance with our chosen ethical position. 
 Being critically reflexive therefore does not imply self-interested introspec-
tion, but involves looking to our own judgement and behaviour as well as to the 
nature of the systems in our particular institution.  If we wish to take a liberal hu-
manist position, with a careful eye to avoiding domination by others by not giving 
permission to them to dominate, we must also allow for the possibility of our own 
tendency to dominate and perpetuate the cycle which we ostensibly condemn.
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